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Recent post-structuralist theories of narrative tend to view narrative structure
as a facile, artificial or misleading construct ("the illusion of sequence," as a
famous symposium put it)—the work of Derrida, Hayden White or Frank
Kermode could be mentioned in this connection. White claims that "it is
because real events do not offer themselves as stories that their
narrativization is so difficult."
But narrativity builds our very sense of reality, the world we live in, the ways
we make sense of it. My contention is that real events already offer
themselves as stories--that deconstruction of narrativity cannot be restricted
to critical, literary or historical representations. It must either revise its
claims or extend them to the area of Gestalt psychology. Sequentiality is not
illusory—rather, it builds reality, it is reality being transformed, negotiated,
and therefore built.
Only, the plots of reality are very traditional stories, whose significance is
heavily determined and difficult to negotiate. Deconstructivist critics easily
lose sight of this inbuilt narrativity. Its ideological nature, nevertheless,
should not be underestimated, and the notion that it is a "natural" kind of
narrativity should itself be deconstructed.
Also, the "misleading" nature of narrative should be more closely examined,
as compared with other available forms of representation. I doubt that
narrative is to blame here more than any other discursive strategy. For
instance, we may think of symbolic structures, images... These also create
"artificial" sense and intelligibility in the same way as narrative, and have
often been the object of deconstructive criticism.
As to the discipline of narratology, it should benefit of the insights of
deconstruction as regards the tentative nature of theoretical constructs; it
should accept that its nature is ultimately that of bricolage, and that it is
subordinated to specific ideological projects—narratology should cease to
posit the fixed and objective existence of its categories and analytical
concepts. But a facile deconstructive dismissal of narratology should be
avoided. Narratology cannot help being "logocentric" or "reductive" from the
moment it accepts, for instance, the notion of the philogenetic relationship
between literary understanding and the development of literary forms for the
sake of establishing a connection with literary history. 
In sum, narratology can benefit from some deconstructive moves, but it
should not surrender to deconstruction without a fight.
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